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ENTRENCHING THE MINORITY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN THAILAND’S
POLITICAL CONFLICT
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang
Abstract:
Since 2006, Thailand has witnessed an unprecedented
surge of judicial activism from the Constitutional Court to scrutinize elected
politicians in the name of the rule of law. Democracy, argued Constitutional
Court judges, could only be consolidated if the rule of law was maintained. But
examination of several high-profile constitutional cases suggested that the
Constitutional Court was actually working on behalf of the powerful elite
minority to obstruct the democratic process under the pretext of protecting the
rule of law. This antagonistic position brewed resentment and violence which
jeopardized the Constitutional Court’s legitimacy as a neutral political arbiter.
The 2014 coup d’etat showed that once again the country has failed to
consolidate its democratization. This failure suggests that the Constitutional
Court’s notion of the rule of law might not be compatible with the notion of
electoral democracy.

INTRODUCTION
The 1997 political reform in Thailand resulted in the establishment
of the Constitutional Court as the guardian of democracy. Its mission
was to bring Thailand peace and stability but the decade-long political
conflict from 2006 up to the present indicated otherwise. Since 2006,
Thailand witnessed several violent demonstrations as well as two coup
d’etats. Much of the conflict surrounded controversial former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who held office from 2001-2006, and can
be explained as a struggle between his supporters who elected and
reelected him into power, and his opponents who repeatedly filed
lawsuits as a means to remove him from power. In many cases, the
actions of the Constitutional Court are believed by many to have helped
escalate tensions to their breaking point. For example, it endorsed an
armed occupation of Bangkok, 1 dissolved major political parties, 2 and
embraced the military regime’s impunity.3 The Constitutional Court was
accused of downplaying the importance of a general election while
emphasizing the rule of law which favored the powerful anti-democratic
minority. As a result, the decisions of the Constitutional Court led to a


Khemthong TONSAKULRUNGRUANG. Ph.D. candidate, the University of Bristol Law
School. kt15603@bristol.ac.uk.
1
Constitutional Court [hereinafter Const. Ct.] No. 45/2557, 2014; Const. Ct. No. 50/2557,
2014.
2
Const. Ct. No. 1-2/2550, 2007; Const. Ct. No. 3-5/2550, 2007; Const. Ct. No. 18-19-20/2551,
2008.
3
Const. Ct. No. 5/2551, 2008.
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crisis, not a solution. After beginning as a neutral arbiter of constitutional
disputes, the Constitutional Court became an active player whose role
was a decisive factor in winning the political struggle.
This paper aims to study the Constitutional Court’s role in the
majority-minority struggle in the post-2006 coup Thailand. Part I
provides an overview of Thailand’s attempt to judicialize politics with the
hope that it would restore public trust and promote clean democracy. It
follows the rise and fall of the Constitutional Court between 1997 and
2016. Part II then closely examines a selection of Constitutional Court
cases decided during this time period. These cases represent the elected
government’s fight to regain its authority to deliberate public policies.
Also, these cases reveal how the Constitutional Court understands its role
in the democratic regime. Finally, Part III concludes this paper by
looking at all the factors that led the Constitutional Court to become the
opponent of the majority.
I.

JUDICIALIZATION OF THAI POLITICS

The Constitutional Court of Thailand was a product of the 1997
political reform, which produced the 1997 People’s Constitution. This
political reform was preceded by the 1991 military takeover of the
civilian government, and the subsequent May 1992 uprising by Thai
citizens against the military-controlled government. The violent clash
forced the military to end its intervention in politics and triggered a
reform to permanently consolidate democracy.4
The 1997 Constitution was created with the goals of empowering
the people and eradicating corruption. 5 In addition to having periodic
free and fair elections, the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA)
created several agencies that would perform a check-and-balance
function. The CDA pursued large-scale judiciary reform, and established
the independent Constitutional Court, 6 Administrative Court, 7 and the
Criminal Division for the Political Office Holders within the Supreme
Court of Justice.8 Reflecting the CDA’s distrust in civilian politicians,
the CDA assigned the judiciary the duty to guard fundamental democratic
principles, such as the rule of law and civil liberties, leading to the
4

CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF THAILAND 250–62 (2d ed. 2014); Tom
Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand's Postpolitical Constitution, 7
INT’L J. CONST. L. 83, 89–91 (2008).
5
Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 94.
6
Radthathammonoon [THAI CONSTITUTION] (B.E. 2540) — 1997 (ch. 8 § 255).
7
See id. § 272.
8
See id. § 276.
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judicialization of Thai politics.9 In addition to the new courts, the CDA
created independent watchdog agencies such as the National CounterCorruption Commission (NCCC) and the Election Commission (EC),
which were under neither the Legislative nor Executive branches. 10
Together, the three newly established courts and these independent
watchdog agencies, would punish arbitrary officials and uphold the rule
of law.
The Constitutional Court was comprised of career judges, legal
experts, and political scientists who were recruited through a complicated
nomination process with as little political oversight as possible.11 The
Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to: (1) review a provision of law and
the law-making process; (2) settle a jurisdictional dispute among the
legislature, the executive, and independent watchdog agencies; (3)
disqualify a corrupt public office holder; and (4) protect the Constitution
and democratic values. 12 Through judicial review, the Constitutional
Court could restore trust in the government, which was necessary to
strengthen Thailand’s weak democracy.
The conception of the Constitutional Court was not without
resistance. Prior to the Constitutional Court, the Thai legal system only
had been used to having only the Court of Justice which had a universal
jurisdiction. The idea of having specialized courts for public law disputes
was a novel one. The Court of Justice opposed the idea of having
professional and non-lawyer judges, as well as the idea of adjudicating
political disputes.13 It feared that the Constitutional Court would invite
political influence into the judiciary.14 However, the CDA managed to
9
Bjoern Dressel, Court and Judicialization in Southeast Asia, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DEMOCRATIZATION 268, 272–77 (William Case ed., 2009); See Thirayuth
Boonmee, Too-la-karn-pi-vat, [Judicial Activism] (2006) (The strongest advocate for judicialization of
politics was perhaps Thirayuth Boonmee, a then lecturer in sociology at Thammasart University, who
first coined the term judicial activism.).
10
Duncan McCargo, Introduction: Understanding Political Reform in Thailand, in ‘REFORMING
THAI POLITICS ’ 1, 10–11 (Duncan McCargo ed. 2001).
11
Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2540) — 1997 (ch. 8 § 255–56); Andrew Harding & Peter Leyland,
The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis; Historical Analysis and Contemporary
Issues in Thai Constitutionalism, SOAS L. 166–69 (2011).
12
Harding & Leyland, supra note 11, at 165; For more details, see also Khemthong
Tonsakulrungruang, The Anti-Majoritarian Constitutional Court of Thailand, presented at the 6th Asian
Constitutional Forum, Singapore, Dec. 11, 2015, 7–10.
13
Harding & Leyland, supra note 11, at 159–61, 191–95 (prior to 1997, the Court of Justice was
the only judicial institution. Judges were professional lawyers recruited through a state entrance
examination. Its jurisdiction covered all private disputes, criminal or civil. Constitutional and
administrative disputes were subject to the Constitutional Council and the Council of State
respectively. Both the Constitutional Council and the Council of State belonged to the executive
branch).
14
James Klein, The Battle for Rule of Law in Thailand: the Constitutional Court of Thailand, in
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND THE WORKING OF THE COURT 35,
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convince the opposition otherwise and the Constitutional Court began
operating in 1998.
The early years of the Constitutional Court produced mixed results
for those hoping for independent judicial review and the protection of
strong democratic institutions. In many early cases, the Constitutional
Court often deferred to the government’s position. 15 However, it
delivered a few important decisions in favor of gender equality, rights of
occupation, and rights in criminal justice processes. 16 Also, it
disqualified and banned several high-profile politicians who were found
guilty of filing false asset statements by the National Counter-Corruption
Commission.17
Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court made a few mistakes too.
Accused politicians were sometimes spared despite their obvious
misconduct.18 For example, in 2003, the Constitutional Court acquitted
Thaksin Shinwatra, then a popular businessman-turned-politician and
potential Prime Minister candidate even though four judges had voted not
guilty against seven who had voted guilty.19 The four abstaining votes
were then counted as not guilty resulting in an 8/7 decision.20 Normally,
the abstaining votes should not have been counted as not guilty.
Moreover, the Constitutional Court raised the standard of proof from
finding a normal intention that Thaksin was aware of his undisclosed
properties to a special intention that Thaksin deliberately lied about his
assets.21

36–37 (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein eds., 2003); Harding & Leyland, supra note 11, at 161–
62.
15
Borwornsak Uwanno, Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand: Past and Present, 4:3
NAT’L TAIWAN UNI. L. REV. 141, 147–50 (2009).
16
Kla Samudavanija, Khob-Ked-Am-Nat-Nha-Tii-Sarn-Ratthathammanoon-pheu-song-sermkarn-pok-krong-nai-ra-bob-prachathippatai-lae-kum-krong-sitthi-seri-paph-khong-pra-cha-chon
[Scope of Power and Duty of the Constitutional Court for Promotion of Democratic Rule and
Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties] King Prajadhipok’s Institute Research Paper 14-15 (2014)
[Thai.] [KPI Research]; see Const. Ct. No. 21/2546, 2003; Const. Ct. No. 25/2547, 2004; Const. Ct.
No. 30/2548, 2005. For judicial deferral, see Klein, supra note 14, at 43–45; Const. Ct. No. 5/2541,
1998; Const. Ct. No. 4/2542, 1999.
17
Klein, supra note 14, at 60, 70.
18
Const. Ct. No. 36/2542, 1999 (a minister received a pending imprisonment sentence which
should disqualify him from the office. However, the Constitutional Court interpreted a disqualification
clause as an actual imprisonment so the accused minister could still retain his seat in the cabinet); See
Const. Ct. No. 4/2544, 2001 (the Constitutional Court acquitted ten members of the cabinet who still
held shares in business entities, citing the lack of evidence for conflict of interest).
19
Const. Ct. No. 20/2544, 2001.
20
Id.
21
Const. Ct. No. 20/2544, 2001; See Klein, supra note 14, at 74–76; Samudivanija, supra note
16, at 169–70 (criticisms of the decision in Const. Ct. No. 20/2544, 2001).
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The mistake was costly. Subsequently, Thaksin rose to primeministership in 2001 and dominated almost all branches of government.
His popularity left the House of Representatives with an opposition too
small to stop him. 22 His wealth and deal-making ability secretly
controlled the Senate and other watchdog agencies, rendering the system
of checks-and-balances ineffective.23 With diminishing oversight, many
of Thaksin’s policies infringed upon rights and liberties of Thais while
enriching himself and his supporters.24 The concerned public asked the
Constitutional Court to scrutinize Thaksin’s actions but the Court always
deferred to the government.25 The Constitutional Court’s deferrals to the
government started to upset the public so there were calls for the
judiciary, as the only remaining institution resistant to Thaksin’s grip, to
be more aggressive in keeping the Prime Minister in check.26 The call for
judicial activism resonated even in the Royal speech to judges during
their swear-in ceremony.27
Although the Constitutional Court finally responded to the call for
activism by invalidating the 2006 general election, 28 it was too late to
rescue its credibility.
A military coup followed month-long
demonstrations in September 2006. The Council for National Security
(CNS) abolished the 1997 Constitution and temporarily suspended the
Constitutional Court.29 The CNS replaced the Constitutional Court with

22

BAKER & PONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 267; Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 97.
Kevin Hewison, Constitutions, Regimes and Power in Thailand, 14:5 CONTEMPORARY
POLITICS 928, 935–36 (2007).
24
PASUK PHONGPAICHIT & CHRIS BAKER, THAKSIN: THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS IN THAILAND
197-224 (1st ed. 2004); Kevin Hewison, Thaksin Shinwatra and the Reshaping of Thai Politics 16:2
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 119–33 (2010); Vivit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand
Inc.”, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA 320–45 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds., 2006).
25
See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, The Tragedy of the 1997 Constitution, in DIVIDED OVER THAKSIN:
THAILAND'S COUP AND PROBLEMATIC TRANSITION 34 (N. John Funston ed., 2009).
26
See Bjoern Dressel, Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary?
Considerations from Recent Events in Thailand, 23:5 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 671, 673 (2010).
27
Id., at 680. Although the king is assumed to be “above politics”, there were evidences that the
Thai monarchy, from time to time, intervened in political crises. Still, making such request in public
was a rare occurrence. See Thongchai Winichakul, Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in
the Room and the State of Denial in Thailand, in GOOD COUP GONE BAD 79 (Pavin
Chatchavalpongpun ed. 2014).
28
Const. Ct. No. 9/2549, 2006 (Thaksin’s opposition staged a month-long protest that forced
Thaksin to dissolve the House and called for a snap election. However, the opposition parties all
boycotted the election for Thaksin set the date too early. They also urged voters to vote no. The
Constitutional Court found the 2006 election unconstitutional due to several irregularities, i.e. low
voter turnout and unusually high number of ballots that casted vote to no candidate, the outcome which
allowed Thaksin’s party the only main party in the Parliament, and the Election Commission’s
unjustifiable change of electoral practice that could enable easier frauds).
29
The Council of National Security Declaration No. 3 (B.E. 2549, 2006).
23
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the Constitutional Council.30 The Constitutional Council went on to find
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party guilty of electoral fraud, dissolved
the party, and, under the CNS’s direction, banned TRT executives from
running for office for five years.31 Undoubtedly, the election invalidation
and the dissolution of TRT showed Thaksin’s opponents that the
judiciary could be an effective tool to counter a politician’s popularity.
The Constitutional Council was automatically dissolved when the
Constitutional Court resumed operating after the 2007 Constitution came
into effect. The 2007 Constitution was fueled by distrust of elected
politicians.32 It so rigorously pursued the goal of building a transparent
Thailand that it expanded the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction and
increased judicial independence from political oversight.33 The modified
Constitutional Court was more powerful and isolated than ever. The
2007 Constitution also, for the first time, commanded that all state
apparatus shall operate in accordance with the rule of law.34 The rule of
law clause signified the changing focus of the supreme law from building
institutions responsive to the people’s needs to selecting public office
holders with desirable personal ethics.
The judicial activism movement has hardly died down. Since
2008, the Constitutional Court has heard a number of high-profile cases
and provided more rigorous protection of the rights and liberties of Thai
citizens.35 Its achievements were clouded, however, by growing numbers
of politically sensitive cases concerning abuse of power, conflict of
interest, and the rule of law. Parties were dissolved, policies revoked,
and individuals dismissed. Post-2006 Thailand was badly divided and the
2007 Constitutional Court faced a very challenging terrain. The political
process was riddled with month-long demonstrations, violent
crackdowns, and lawsuits.36 Often, the Constitutional Court’s decisions
further enflamed controversies rather than ending them, which prompted

30

Thai Interim Charter (B.E. 2549, 2007) (§ 35) (The panel consisted of the President of the
Supreme Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, five Supreme Court judges and
two Supreme Administrative Court judges).
31
Const. Council. Decision No. 3-5/2550, 2007.
32
Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 104.
33
Borwornsak Uwanno, Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand: Past and Present, at
163–66.
34
Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2550) — 2007 (ch. 1 § 3).
35
Samudavanija, supra note 16, at 149–66.
36
BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 273–80.
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the attempted impeachments of judges and discussions on how to reform
the judiciary or nullify unjust decisions.37
In addition to controversial decisions, the Constitutional Court was
embroiled in scandals involving conflicts of interest and other
inappropriate behaviors. Erroneous comments and interviews were made
by judges, some even on the bench. 38 Judges hired their children as
personal aides and recruited them as staff members.39 One even granted
the Constitutional Court’s scholarship to his son for education abroad.40
Despite numerous examples of judicial misbehavior, no judge has ever
been held accountable. In fact, the Constitutional Court behaved quite
similarly to the politicians they condemned.
In 2014, a coup d’etat helped end the conflict temporarily. The
2007 Constitution was abolished and replaced with the 2014 Interim
Charter which gave the military junta total and absolute control over
Thailand.41 But, unlike in 2006, the military junta, under the auspice of
the National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO), allowed the
Constitutional Court to survive and continue exercising its judicial review
power. 42
However, the Constitutional Court may not review
constitutionality of orders and acts of the NCPO.43 In practice, when a
democratic constitution is absent and the government has absolute
impunity, judicial review is no longer meaningful. The Constitutional

37

See generally Samudavanija, supra note 16; Duncan McCargo & Peeradej Tanruangporn,
Branding Dissent: Nitirat, Thailand’s Enlightened Jurists, J. CONTEMP. ASIA. 1, 6–7 (2015).
38
“Wasan” urges a look at English draft, KHAO SOD NEWSPAPER (June 7, 2012),
http://www.khaosod.co.th/view_newsonline.php?newsid=TVRNek9EazVORGszTnc9PQ (Thai.) (the
President of the Constitutional Court defended the Court’s decision by urging the public to rely on the
English draft of the 2007 Constitution, an English draft of which did not exist); Bangkok Pundit,
Constitutional Court Judge: High speed rail not necessary for Thailand, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT (Jan.
9,
2014),
https://asiancorrespondent.com/2014/01/constitution-court-judge-high-speed-rail-notnecessary-for-thailand/ (Another well-known incident when the Constitutional Court judge complained
during the hearing of the government’s high-speech rail project that he personally believed that the
project was unnecessary because the government’s priority should have been to get rid of all gravel
roads).
39
Saksith Saiyasombut, New Leaked Video Dishes yet another Scandal at Thailand’s
Constitution
Court,
ASIAN
CORRESPONDENT
(Nov.
10,
2010),
http://asiancorrespondent.com/2010/11/new-leaked-video-dishes-yet-another-scandal-at-thailandsconstitution-court/.
40
Anuphan Chantana, Judge upbraided for letting son go on paid study leave, THE NATION
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Judge-upbraided-for-letting-son-goon-paid-study-l-30213603.html.
41
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, Thailand’s Newest Charter – A Quick First Look,
CONSTITUTIONNET (July 24, 2014) http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/thailands-newest-charterquick-first-look.
42
The National Council for Peace and Order Declaration No. 11/2557 (B.E. 2557, 2014).
43
Thai Interim Constitution (B.E. 2557) — 2014 (§ 44,45).
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Court has, so far, delivered a few decisions which were criticized as
helping the junta maintain its authoritarian grip over Thailand.44
From the moderately conservative beginning, the Constitutional
Court had gradually gained public acceptance. However, its conservative
nature upset the public and led to its own demise. The reinstated
Constitutional Court was more aggressive, yet more polarized as well.
While it was praised by many for providing checks-and-balances, others
accused it of manipulating a government. As the following cases
revealed, no longer was it a neutral arbiter of Thai politics.
II.

STRUGGLE TO RULE: CASE STUDIES

Battles between civilian politicians and the Constitutional Court
were most contentious during two periods: during 2008 and from 2012 to
2014, when Thaksin-affiliated parties won general elections. In 2008, the
People’s Power Party (PPP), the descendant of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai
(TRT), was in power with two prime ministers: Samak Sundaravej and
Somchai Wongsawat. Beginning in 2011 and continuing through 2014,
Thaksin’s youngest sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, led the Pheu Thai (PT)
government, 45 where from 2012 to 2014 the Constitutional Court
delivered most of its controversial decisions. These decisions had high
political impact as they concerned key governmental policies and
generated strong reactions from both Thaksin’s supporters and opponents
such as criticism, prosecution, and even armed conflicts. 46 Basically
these cases were focused on two main issues: the executive’s treatymaking power and the election of the Senate. Both were the products of
the 2007 Constitution’s attempts to prevent Thaksin Shinawatra’s return
to power.47
During his administration, Thaksin entered into many bi-lateral and
multi-lateral agreements that many criticized as jeopardizing Thailand’s
economy and society.48 Treaty-making under the 1997 Constitution was
relatively easy. Unless the treaty would (1) change Thailand’s territory,
Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, Thailand’s Referendum Roadblock, NEW M ANDALA (Aug.
4, 2016), http://www.newmandala.org/false-serious-business-thailands-referendum/.
45
CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 4, at 279–80.
46
Enlightened Jurists’ Open Letters, ENLIGHTENED JURISTS, http://www.enlightenedjurists.com/blog (Thai.) (criticism of the Constitutional Court’s decisions); Pavin Chachavalpongpun,
From Market Place back to Battlefield: Thai-Cambodian Relations in the Age of a Militarized Politics,
in GOOD COUP GONE BAD 253, 259–60 (Pavin Chachavalpongpun ed. 2014) (accounts of armed
conflict and legal persecution).
47
Borwornsak Uwanno, supra note 15, at 164–65.
48
See Thitinan Pongsudhirak, The imperative of Thailand's trade policy, BANGKOK POST (Oct.
23, 2015), http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/740160/.
44
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(2) alter the jurisdiction of the State, or (3) require an act for
implementation, the cabinet reserved its prerogative to proceed with the
treaty without parliamentary approval. 49 Section 190 of the 2007
Constitution reacted by expanding the categories of treaties that required
legislative approval to any treaty which: (1) provides for a change in the
Thai territories; (2) provides for a change in the Thai external territories
that Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction over such territories
under any treaty or an international law; (3) requires the enactment of an
Act for its implementation; (4) has a vast impact on the country’s
economic and social stability; or (5) has a significant binding effect upon
the trade, investment, or budget of the country.50 Before entering into an
agreement, the cabinet was required to provide a framework of the
negotiation to the Legislative Assembly and the public as well as a plan
to relieve people who were likely to be affected by the treaty.51 If it is
unclear whether a treaty falls under one of the five categories, the
Constitutional Court would rule if that treaty meets the Section 190
requirements. 52
The cabinet’s treaty-making power was then
significantly limited.
Prime Minister Thaksin was also condemned for puppeteering the
Senate. The Senate was supposed to be a non-partisan body which
selected candidates for watchdog agencies. But the fact that all the
members of the Senate were elected by a vote of the people meant that
several candidates relied on politicians’ existing networks and assistance
to win elections.53 As a result, many senators were proxies of political
parties or even relatives of politicians, rendering watchdog agencies such
as the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) and the
Election Commission (EC) weak and biased. 54 The 2007 Constitution
attempted to compromise by designing a half-elected, half-nominated
Senate. 55 Still, the model was criticized for its lack of clarity.
Nominations of senators were vulnerable to secret lobbying among a few
members of the Senate nomination committee.56

Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2540) — 1997 (ch. 7 § 224).
Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2550) — 2007 (ch.9 §190).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Michael H. Nelson, Delaying Constitutionalism to Protect Establishment Hegemony in
Thailand, in POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 49, 59 (Marco Buente & Bjoern
Dressel eds., 2017); Radthathammonoon (B.E. 2550) — 2007 (ch. 5 §114).
54
PHONGPAICHIT & BAKER, supra note 24 at 173–76.
55
Michael H. Nelson, supra note 53, at 59–62.
56
Harding & Layland, supra note 11, at 45.
49
50
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The Thai-Cambodian Joint Communique Case (2008)

In 2008, Thaksin’s proxy, the People’s Power Party, won the
general election and Samak Sundaravej, the PPP leader, became the
Prime Minister. His cabinet signed a Joint Communique (JC) with
Cambodia, stating that Thailand would not raise an objection to
Cambodia’s bid to unilaterally register Preah Vihear Temple as a World
Heritage site. 57 The ruined temple, situated along the obscure ThaiCambodian border, was awarded to Cambodia by the International Court
of Justice after years of bitter argument.58 Since both parties regarded the
ruined temple as the pride of their ancient glory and greatness, there was
very strong emotion attached to the case. 59 However, the boundary
dispute between the two countries remained an unresolved ticking time
bomb.
From the government’s perspective, the Joint Communique (JC)
was not a treaty, as it had no legal effect.60 They believed it did not
encroach upon Thailand’s interest over the ill-demarcated boundary, a
position guaranteed by Cambodia and UNESCO. 61 But the People’s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which had rallied against Thaksin in
2005-2006, saw the situation differently. They believed that this JC
might imply Thailand’s acceptance of Cambodia’s sovereignty over the
disputed area adjacent to the Temple and therefore could potentially lead
to territorial loss.62 Deliberately employing nationalistic rhetoric, PAD
was able to mobilize massive and rather violent demonstrations to serve
its goal of ousting Thaksin’s proxy. 63 The PAD accused Samak’s
government of not following Section 190 procedures and brought the
case to the Constitutional Court.64
The Constitutional Court unanimously ruled that the JC was a
treaty since it legally bound the two parties.65 The Constitutional Court
57

Chachavalpongpun, supra note 46, at 259–60.
See Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. Rep.
6 (June 15).
59
See Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Temple of Doom: Hysteria about Preah Vihear Temple in the
Thai Nationalistic Discourse, in LEGITIMACY CRISIS IN THAILAND 83, 92–93, 105–09 (Marc Askew
ed., 2010).
60
Id. at 94.
61
Id. at 87–89.
62
Chachavalpongpun, supra note 46, at 260.
63
Noppon Wong-anan, Thai PM's foes throw nationalist temple tantrum, THE STAR (June 25,
2008), http://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2008/06/25/thai-pms-foes-throw-nationalist-templetantrum_1/.
64
Courts asked to nullify deal on Preah Vihear, BANGKOK POST (June 27, 2008) http://kimedia.blogspot.co.uk/2008/06/court-asked-to-nullify-deal-on-preah.html.
65
Const. Ct. No. 6-7/2551, 2008, at 21.
58
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was convinced that the JC might result in a change to Thailand’s territory
because it accepted Cambodia’s right over the disputed vicinity of the
Temple.66 Moreover, citing the PAD protest, the Court determined that
the signing of the JC had immense effect on Thailand’s and Cambodia’s
societies.67
The decision was a huge blow to the Samak cabinet. Although
Samak cabinet had consulted with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Constitutional Court disagreed with the Ministry that this JC had legal
effect as a treaty.68 The Constitutional Court read the law more broadly
as well, determining that any treaty which “might” result in a territorial
change must comply with Section 190. 69 Also, according to the
Constitutional Court, the government failed to foresee the social impact
of this treaty. The burden of determining the social and economic impact
of a proposed treaty was suddenly placed upon the cabinet’s shoulders.
The 2007 Constitution provided no specific remedies for a
violation of Section 190. But Noppadol Pattama, the Foreign Minister,
resigned. 70 The NCCC charged him and Samak with malfeasance,
abusing their power, and deliberately causing Thailand to lose territorial
interest.71 These charges created momentum for the PAD to continue
protesting. The protests escalated and resulted in airport closures a few
months later. 72 The decision also strained the ties between the two
nations and led to deadly skirmishes along the border.73
B.

The Constitution Amendment Series (2012-2014)

The PPP government ended prematurely in December 2008 when
the Constitutional Court dissolved the party under an electoral fraud
charge.74 Abhisit Vejajiva of the Democrat Party, Thaksin’s rival, was
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able to form a coalition government under the brokerage of the military.75
His minority cabinet enjoyed a relatively peaceful period of 2009-2011,
which benefited from no aggressive judicial review cases. Thaksin’s
supporters tried to organize mass demonstrations against Abhisit twice
but both ended in violent military crackdowns.76
Even Abhisit realized that the 2007 Constitution severely restricted
his administration’s performance. In 2010-2011, he carried out a minor
political reform. Two of the primary targets were the treaty-making
clause and the mechanisms for Senate selection. There was no
constitutional challenge to Abhisit’s move but the half-hearted reform
only added that there shall be laws clarifying criteria in the two cases.77
These laws never came. He later lost to Thaksins’ youngest sister,
Yingluck, who led Pheu Thai (PT) party in the 2011 election.78
As soon as Yingluck Shinawatra assumed the office of Prime
Minister, she intended to fulfill her 2011 election campaign promise of
further amending the 2007 Constitution. The 2007 Constitution was
unpopular not only because it deliberately crippled a popularly elected
government, but also because it lacked legitimacy.79 It was drafted by the
junta-appointed body with little outside participation so it was seen as the
legacy of the military government, not of the people. Even though the
2007 Constitution was approved by referendum, many regarded that
referendum process as rigged because supporters of the 2006 coup
persuaded Thaksin’s followers that they had to accept the draft in order to
end the military regime and they could later amend the law.80
Attempts to amend the 2007 Constitution were made twice.
Initially Yingluck attempted to introduce an independent body which
would study and prepare new charter provisions. After the first attempt
failed, she chose a humbler path of amending only specific sections
regarding the Senate and treating-making power. The Constitutional
Court struck down the second attempt in two separate lawsuits.
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The Wholesale Amendment Attempt

Yingluck’s first move was bold. She planned to amend Section
291, which prescribed the constitution amendment process. According to
Section 291, both houses of Parliament shall meet in a joint session to
consider the motion to amend the constitution. An approval required a
supermajority. 81 Yingluck intended to replace Section 291 with an
amended provision creating the Constitutional Drafting Assembly that
allowed for broader public participation in the amendment process similar
to the 1997 CDA. Her opposition certified the case to the Constitutional
Court under Section 68.82
Normally, a provision of law reviewable by the Constitutional
Court strictly meant an organic act or a parliamentary statute. A motion
to amend the constitution, therefore, could not be filed through an
ordinary judicial review channel. However, Yingluck’s opponents
claimed that an amendment was an act to gain power to rule the country
through undemocratic means, which fell under Section 68. Section 68
provided the authority for an individual to petition to the Constitutional
Court if he or she witnessed an act that jeopardized democracy or the
constitution.83 But the government quickly pointed out that Yingluck’s
opposition was not authorized to directly file a suit to the Constitutional
Court. To prevent a huge flood of frivolous lawsuits, Section 68 required
the Attorney-General to investigate complaints and file the case, a
precedent the Constitutional Court had always adhered to.
Nonetheless, for the first time, the Constitutional Court ignored its
precedent and accepted the claim without Attorney-General oversight.
The Constitutional Court justified its acceptance of the case by
determining that Section 68 actually provided a dual-track for judicial
review. 84 The Court held that in urgent situations that required the
immediate protection of democracy or the constitution, an individual
could bypass the Attorney-General and submit a case directly to the
Constitutional Court.85
Despite hearing the case, the Constitutional Court did not find the
motion for amendment unconstitutional. The amendment proposal did
81
82
83
84
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not explicitly state that it purported to take down Thailand’s democracy.
That conclusion would be too far-fetched without observing practical
effects of the new Constitution Drafting Assembly. Nonetheless, the
Constitutional Court suggested that since the 2007 Constitution was voted
into effect, any proposal to amend the charter should have been approved
by a referendum first.86
Nowhere did Section 291 mention a referendum or other method of
public participation. It simply required an absolute majority and
prohibited amending certain areas of the constitution.87 Given the lack
of textual support, many view the Constitutional Court’s decision as an
attempt to invent a constitutional barrier to thwart the government’s plan.
Moreover, the language of the decision was ambiguous since the
Constitutional Court did not explicitly demand a referendum, but merely
recommended so.88 At first, MPs from the PT party moved to impeach
judges for acting ultra vires.89 When anger over this attempted maneuver
subsided, the government tried to compromise by postponing the
amendment for more careful study.90
2.

The By-Section Amendment Attempt

After months of dormancy, the government tried a different
strategy. It would proceed according to steps prescribed by Section 291
to amend the 2007 Constitution to provide for popular election of all
senators and shorten the treaty-making process. However, the antiThaksin faction directly filed complaints under Section 68 for the second
time.
The following two decisions encapsulated and clarified the
Constitutional Court’s view of both proposed amendments. In the case of
the Senate election, the Constitutional Court explained its understanding
of democracy stating that democracy was not always about the majority’s
rule.91 Popular mandate could easily turn into tyranny by the majority.
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Therefore, a democratic country needed be governed by the rule of law.92
The 2007 Constitution’s goal was to create an honest and transparent
government that acted in the best interests of the public. 93 The
Constitutional Court was designated by the 2007 Constitution to ensure
that the government respected the rule of law through the power of
checks-and-balances.94
The Constitutional Court found the government’s motion to amend
the 2007 Constitution unconstitutional for two reasons. On procedural
grounds, the Court found that the government unduly changed the
original bill and the President of the Parliament reduced the time allotted
for parliamentary debate.95 Moreover, several MPs were absent at the
time of voting, but they asked their peers to forge their vote.96 As the
result, quorum was lacking and the process was undemocratic.
On substantive grounds, the Constitutional Court saw the Senate as
an important checks-and-balances mechanism because it appointed
watchdog agencies and heard an impeachment trial of a parliamentary
member. It was, thus, important that the Senate maintained its
independence from political parties. An all-elected chamber would turn
the clock back to 1997 when the whole Parliament was “the family
business” of spouses in both Houses. 97 This situation could lead to
another crisis and another coup d’etat. Because the government’s
proposal could impair the Senate’s ability to check upon itself, the
government was trying to gain the power to run the country through
undemocratic means.98 The Constitutional Court spared the government
by not dissolving the PT party. But the NCCC prepared an impeachment
of all MPs that voted in favor of the amendment proposal.99
Critics pointed out that a senatorial election is a common practice
in democratic countries. 100 How could more popular elections be
undemocratic? Further, there was no such prohibition in the 2007
Constitution, and the House of Representatives was already full of MPs,
92
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regardless of parties, with familial ties with one another.101 Thus, similar
to the referendum requirement the Court divined within Section 291, it
again imposed more restrictions than the Constitution provided.
A few months later, the Constitutional Court delivered its third
decision in the constitution amendment series. The case concerned the
amendment of Section 190 in order to simplify and eliminate ambiguity
in the treaty-making process.102 The government planned to exempt from
the constitutional requirements under Section 190 a treaty which (1) has a
vast impact on the country’s economic and social stability, or (2) has a
significant binding effect upon the trade, investment, or budget of the
country.103 Similar to the procedural posture of the case examined above,
the same party again filed a complaint under Section 68.
The Constitutional Court’s decision was consistent with its prior
ruling, reminding the government that Thai constitutional democracy
does not require all matters to be decided by majority rule. Further,
democracy can become tyrannical if the majority ignores the rule of law
or harasses the minority. 104 The Constitutional Court had the duty to
guard Thailand’s democracy by reviewing the government’s exercise of
power.105
The Constitutional Court found that the President of the Parliament
closed debate on the amendment prematurely. Although the government
accused the opposition of using a foot-dragging technique to delay the
consideration of the proposal, the Constitutional Court believed that it
was important to give all stakeholders, especially the minority, a fair
chance to express their views.106 According to the Constitutional Court,
amending the constitution is a serious issue and the government could
only move forward after careful and thorough consultation.107
Also, the Court found that the substantive changes to the treatymaking process violated the Constitution. Citing the Joint Communique
case, the Constitutional Court pointed out that entering into an
international agreement could cause catastrophic damage to the country.
Removal of a treaty from the procedural safeguards would deprive the
101
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Legislative Assembly of the chance to scrutinize the Executive’s exercise
of power. The Constitutional Court compared the administrative burden
with the benefit to the public and determined that the latter outweighed
the former. This amendment was intended by the majority party to evade
the Thai system of checks-and-balances, so the Court viewed it as another
attempt to gain the power to rule the country through undemocratic
means.108
The third decision ended the government’s dream of regaining its
treaty-making authority. The Constitutional Court’s reasoning signaled
the Judiciary’s dwindling patience with the government’s action. By the
time of the third decision, Yingluck had made a grave mistake by forcing
a universal amnesty bill through the Lower House. 109 The move
infuriated the public because the breadth of its scope would immunize
Thaksin from corruption charges as well as the army which was under
investigation for manslaughter during political protests.110 After another
troubled election which the opposition boycotted, the Constitutional
Court invalidated the election, leaving the country in a political
vacuum. 111
Further street demonstrations crippled the interim
government well into May 2014, when the Constitutional Court vacated
Yingluck from premiership for promoting her brother-in-law as the new
National Police Chief.112 The Constitutional Court found that the Prime
Minister had violated the rule of law because the transfer was for her
family’s personal benefit. 113 The month-long political crisis reached a
deadlock and General Prayuth Chan-Ocha, the Army Commander,
carried out the coup d’etat in May 2014.114
III.

POLITICIZATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

The governing parties and the Constitutional Court focused on
different notions of democracy. Samak and Yingluck relied on popular
mandate to formulate their key policies while the Constitutional Court
stressed the need to respect the rule of law. Both are correct and can
108
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potentially co-exist. But one shall supplement the other. While the
Constitutional Court had to protect fundamental principles from the
majority’s unwise decision, it was improper to dismiss the voice of the
people completely.
During 2008 and 2011-2014, the Constitutional Court played a
major role in effectively obstructing the democratically elected
governments from implementing key policies. 115 The Constitutional
Court’s hostility to the wisdom of the majority was rooted in the rapidly
changing political phenomenon, the ill-designed constitution, as well as
the majority’s ignorance.
Thaksin’s ultra-popularity relied heavily on support from the socalled grassroots majority. They had long been neglected by his
predecessors. His populist policies provided them a chance to gain
political control, but this ascension alarmed the established elite who long
dominated Thailand’s political resources. 116 This phenomenon was
unprecedented. The threat to their status quo urged them to remove
Thaksin from power. Unfortunately, Thaksin managed to monopolize the
legislature so they had to resort to the judiciary. The invalidation of the
general election and the dissolution of TRT showed them how powerful
the Constitutional Court could be, demonstrating that the 2007
Constitution was designed to utilize judicial power to its fullest.
At a constitutional level, the 2007 Constitution was drafted upon a
faulty premise. The judiciary was not guarding the constitution from a
corrupt or arbitrary politician, but from Thaksin. The Constitutional
Court was equipped with the ultimate power to intervene in politics.
Without a mechanism to ensure its accountability, the Constitutional
Court’s almost absolute power was prone to be abused. Moreover, at a
personal level, anti-Thaksin figures were recruited onto the bench.117 As
a result, the Constitutional Court represented the interests of the minority
115
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to suppress Thaksin and his political allies. But because Thaksin was the
personification of electoral politics supported by popular elections, an
anti-Thaksin Constitutional Court quickly became an anti-majoritarian
one. The politicized Constitutional Court was then dragged into
contentious partisan political disputes.118
In the 2008 case concerning the Thai-Cambodian JC, it was
beyond doubt that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court. But the two parties, the cabinet and judges, read the
JC differently and the Constitutional Court did not defer to the Thai and
Cambodian governments’ understanding. The Constitutional Court
speculated possible territorial loss that the government did not foresee.
Also, the government did not have the benefit of hindsight concerning the
societal disunity that the Constitutional Court enjoyed. The Court’s
disagreement was a departure from its usually deferential stance, which
created a sense of uncertainty and paranoia in the executive branch.
The series of cases between 2012-2014 were more interesting.
Perhaps at this point, Thailand was more polarized politically. By citing
the rule of law, the Constitutional Court made a daring move to depart
from its precedential decisions concerning Section 68. Allowing direct
petitions under Section 68 contradicted the text of law, the original
intention, as well as common sense. The first in the series was a mere
suggestion, made out of the Constitutional Court’s creativity. The PT
government was willing to please the judiciary by delaying the move and
switching to amending individual sections. But still, the Constitutional
Court was not pleased with that.
Prime Minister Yingluck was also partially to blame. Her
government copied Thaksin’s modus operandi by silencing the opposition
with its overwhelming popularity. 119 It learned nothing from its past
mistakes and arbitrarily rushed the consideration of the proposals. The
blatant ignorance of procedural safeguards led to its unsuccessful
attempts to amend the constitution.120 The Constitutional Court was right
that democracy, without the rule of law, could slide into popular
118
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authoritarianism. But the Constitutional Court did not stop there. As it
went on to review the substance of the amendments, it drew criticism of
imposing its political preference while disregarding the wishes of the
majority. Its reasoning was questionable and also out of touch with the
political reality.
Accusing the government of gaining its power through
undemocratic means was a punishment disproportionate to the
government’s actions. Such punishment signaled the National CounterCorruption Commission to prepare an impeachment of more than 300
MPs who approved the amendment proposal. An en masse impeachment
could be seen as the punishment for siding with Thaksin. These decisions
confirmed the public’s suspicion of the Constitutional Court’s lack of
neutrality. Together with other controversial decisions and personal
scandals, its credibility eroded fast.
The rule of law was an ambiguous term. Ambiguity could be
useful and hazardous at the same time. The Constitutional Court of
Thailand was designed to be immune from almost all external
interventions, so when it took full liberty in interpreting the term, the rule
of law was used as a catch-all phrase to suppress the majority. It enabled
the Constitutional Court to cross the fine line and govern the country. In
order to prevent the tyranny of the majority, the Constitutional Court
entrenched the oligarch’s presence in Thailand’s politics. The minority
might not be able to actively introduce its policies, but it could block ones
from the majority and steer Thailand to its liking. The Constitutional
Court emphasized checks without balances.
The coup d’etat is an epitome of the minority-majority struggle to
rule. Although the NCPO claimed that it came to end the conflict, it was
obvious that the NCPO was acting on behalf of the anti-Thaksin faction.
Thus, it showed no interest in addressing the problem of the
Constitutional Court’s dwindling legitimacy. Instead, it planned to
transform the Constitutional Court to an even more powerful proxy of the
minority establishment.121 Such a move was dangerous, for the damage
to Thailand’s judiciary would be severe and long-lasting.
Despite the current calmness on the surface, the Constitutional
Court is still a source of tension and distrust within Thai society. The
Constitutional Court was seen as helping the minority side of the conflict
to entrench their interests and presence while suppressing and ignoring
121
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the majority. Judges were allegedly asserting their personal opinion into
reasoning and, as the result, acting as the government themselves. The
Constitutional Court is being accused of obstructing democratizing
process rather than promoting it. There is little wonder that, as soon as
democracy resumes, the Constitutional Court will again be part of the
political conflict.
IV.

CONCLUSION

High-profile cases from 2008 to 2014 indicate that the
Constitutional Court had transformed from the guardian of the
constitution to a powerful ally of the anti-democratic establishment.
While the democratically elected government tried to regain the control
over its exercise of power, the Constitutional Court struck these attempts
down, claiming that they violated the rule of law. This series of decisions
against the governments drew heavy criticism that the Court was
entrenching the minority’s control of Thai politics. Although the
Constitutional Court was designed to be immune from external oversight,
it was trading its credibility over the expansion of the judicial power, the
price so costly and damage irreparable.
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